Azerbaijan’s strategic position at the crossroads of Europe and Asia establishes it as a key player in regional initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Middle Corridor, and now, increasingly, the Caspian-Black Sea-EU Green Energy Corridor. This geographical advantage, coupled with a robust infrastructure that includes critical ports, railways, and highways, enables Azerbaijan to position itself as a trade and economic tie across different regions. Notable advancements like the improvements at the Port of Baku (Alat) and the renovation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway underline the country’s commitment to enhancing and streamlining its transportation network, aligning with its economic interests by opening new avenues for trade, investment, and cooperation.

In February 2025, I had the opportunity to visit Syria, which recently underwent a rapid regime change. Although this country may be considered far from the South Caucasus at first glance, it is much closer than is commonly believed. This underlines the broader point made by Svante Cornell in the Fall 2020 edition of Baku Dialogues that the “geopolitics of Eurasia and the Middle East have merged.” Today, Syria can be of great value to Azerbaijan.

From 22 to 24 April 2025, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev paid a state visit to China at the invitation of his counterpart Xi Jinping. This milestone event came amid heightened geopolitical and geoeconomic locomotion as well as against the background of a flurry of diplomatic activity centered on Azerbaijan. In the month of April, there were visits by the President of Iran (28 April), the OSCE Secretary General (25 April), the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (25 April), the President of Georgia (16 April), and the President of Germany (2 April), as well as several visits by cabinet ministers and senior officials of intergovernmental organizations.

Over the past three years, geopolitical shifts in Europe and the Silk Road region have significantly impacted global supply chains, triggering heated debates on the liability of various transport routes. One of the few whose standing has increased in the past few years is the Middle Corridor multimodal transport route (Trans-Caspian International Route), coming to be seen as one of the most viable options for unhindered cargo flow in the East-West direction. As a geopolitical project, the Middle Corridor is a unique route as it is solely controlled by the participating countries themselves, without the explicit influence of major outside powers.

The second term of Donald Trump’s administration unlocked a period of a worldwide strategic uncertainty and ambiguity. The present-day focus of international attention is centering now on the evolving progression in the U.S.-EU-Russia triangle, mainly in relation to the European War (a.k.a. war in Ukraine). That “grand matter” shades other regions of the globe, which, nonetheless, remain entirely exposed to the direct and unintended effects of the unfolding dynamics. One of such areas is the Silk Road region—the geoeconomic and geocultural amalgam of Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the South Caucasus, which stretches along the ancient East-West trade route. This IDD Analytical Policy Memo evaluates how the condensing “strategic haze” at the global level and the growing polarization between major powers can affect the Silk Road region locus and forge both challenges and opportunities to the region’s actors.

The inauguration of Donald Trump’s second presidential administration in the United States on 20 January 2025 opened a period of turbulence, uncertainty, and unpredictability at the worldwide level. Shifting strategic paradigms, fluctuating international alliances and new situational alignments, tariff wars, cynical transactional deal offers, non-diplomatic pressures, bombastic claims, and many other factors are reflecting the tectonic rearrangement of the global security landscape.

Two months have passed since the collapse of Bashar Assad’s rule in Damascus. Syria starts progressively disappearing from the news headlines. Fewer “white noises” generated by media makes it possible to construct initial conclusions and intermediate projections related to potential developments in Syria and around it. The most fundamental conclusion is that after the fall of the ancien regime, the Syrian crisis is not over; it is just transforming into the next stage and taking different form. Therefore, the vast cast of domestic and external actors engaged in the Syrian plot reassesses their roles, goals, and objectives in the new environment that emerged after December 2024. One of the key actors in the play is Türkiye.

Azerbaijan has put forward several initiatives to be a platform for cooperation between the Global South and the Global North by increasing its interaction with developing countries. As President Ilham Aliyev stated on 20 July 2024 at the Shusha Global Media Forum: “We launch initiatives. We now actively work with developing countries in order to build bridges between the Global South and the Global North. Our advantage is that we’ve been chairing the Non-Aligned Movement for four years.” As an active supporter of multilateralism (in the past few months, Azerbaijan successfully organized COP29, took over the chairmanship of CICA, and completed its chairmanship of GUAM) that pursues an independent foreign policy posture and is located at the crossroads of flagship connectivity projects, Azerbaijan aims to strengthen its standing as a bridge between East and West.

Judging from the standpoint of its national interests as it itself understood them at the time, Russia lost this war at the moment its missiles first hit Kyiv in the early morning of 24 February 2022. Yet, paradoxically, there is no other way left for Russia except to endure and reiterate the same pattern over and over again in anticipation of a different outcome. Attacking Ukraine was a war of choice. As such, the Kremlin (theoretically) still can reassess its course and agree to negotiate a reasonable compromise whilst finding a way to claim a “triumph” for its domestic audience.

On 4 December 2024, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced sanctions targeting 19 top members of Georgia’s government and security establishment. This decision followed a crackdown on demonstrations and the detention or arrest of some protesters in the wake of Georgia’s contested parliamentary elections last October, in which the ruling Georgian Dream party declared victory. This episode, among many others, reflects the continuing evolution of the post-Soviet space.

Commercial vessels passing through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea handled an estimated 15 percent of global trade in 2023, including 25-30 percent of all container traffic. Since the Houthi attacks began, the number of vessels passing through the Suez Canal has fallen by 85 percent. Many large shipping companies are using alternative routes. As a result, according to one estimate, the freight costs of shipping from Asia to Europe rose by nearly 300 percent between October 2023 to March 2024.

The tragic death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in a plane crash in May 2024 marked the beginning of a new stage in Iranian politics. A month and a half later, the election of Masud Pezeshkian, a reformist of ethnic-Azerbaijani origin, as the new president of the country gives many hopes for positive changes in the domestic and foreign policy of the Islamic Republic. However, given Iran’s sophisticated political system, headed by the Supreme Leader (Rahbar, in Persian), rapid reforms cannot yet be expected.

The 2024 summer campaign of the European War (a.k.a., the war in Ukraine) is in full swing. So far, this campaign has not brought about any dramatic changes in the strategic military situation on the ground. However, associated developments are not limited to the particular war theatre only, but outspread far beyond it. While Russian and Ukrainian troops are bleeding in fierce combat for hamlets, tracts, and groves, which are hard to locate even on a detailed map, the broader conflict’s settings are gradually evolving toward globalization. What was initially contemplated as a brief military operation under an adagio of “Kiev in three days” has been transformed into a long drawn-out war that has no political solution in sight but instead presents a growing possibility of evolving into a wide confrontation between the West and Russia and its allies. The rhetoric and activities of both Russia and the Western alliance steadily yet surely escalate, projecting their mutual antagonism to other regions of the world. The potential consequences of that collision course could be severe.

The uncertainty of the global strategic environment increases as competition between powers and alliances intensifies, projecting insecurity in many parts of the world. One of the contested zones is the Arctic, a spatial and largely uninhabited region that once was considered by much of the world as a peripheral geography. The toxic perplexity of the renewal of a zero-sum mindset, new geoeconomic circumstances, emerging technologies, and the increasingly visible effects of climate change in the circumpolar north progressively shape settings for potentially destructive scenarios. An adjacent zone, the Baltic Sea region, has historically appeared to be different. It is an area engulfing a busy and crowded water basin, which became a theatre in two world wars, and where the Euro-Atlantic community maintains direct territorial contact with Russia.

Azerbaijan has just announced that, starting on 20 May 2024, cargo transportation through the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway will be restored to full capacity following the modernization process. The renovation of BTK, a crucial part of a greater plan to expand the route amid changing geopolitical and geoeconomic paradigms throughout the Silk Road region and beyond, is a testament to a commitment by the relevant states that belong to its western core to enhance connectivity. The transformation of the global security environment caused in part by the heating up of the conflict over Ukraine in February 2022 has significantly impacted the global supply chain, pushing major actors to seek alternative transit routes. The decision to modernize BTK came about as a part of Azerbaijan’s decision to turn this keystone railway line into a main artery of the Trans-Caspian Transit Route (TITR), i.e., the Middle Corridor.

Recently, Baku has been actively increasing interaction with the countries of Central Asia. Frequent state visits of the leaders of the countries of this region to Azerbaijan and reciprocal visits of its president, Ilham Aliyev, are but the most evident pieces of evidence of this increasingly important geopolitical and geoeconomic trend. In addition to economic aspects, Central Asia is becoming of great importance for Azerbaijan from a diplomatic point of view. Thus, Kazakhstan, being one of the closest partners for Baku in the region, today acts as a mediator in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process.

If we consider most of the countries with which Azerbaijan has cultivated a special relationship, it is quite visible that the relations between those countries and France have recently improved and that the problems, when they existed, have been reduced or fixed. For example, since January 2021, the tensions between France and Türkiye have drastically decreased. The joint naval exercises, in the context of NATO, have multiplied during the last three years, with an increasingly warm wording of the French Navy. The trial of the PKK’s funding network in Paris ended with jail sentences in April 2023. The strong Turkish support for Ukraine, even before the invasion of February 2022 and the implementation of bank sanctions by Türkiye in 2024, have been appreciated. In 2022, Turkish imports from France increased by 18.8 percent and 2023 broke the absolute record of the bilateral trade.

In recent years, the use of art to foster the peaceful resolution of disputes among conflicting parties has become increasingly significant. The transformative and unifying power of art can play an important role in establishing empathy between post-conflict parties, facilitating active listening and understanding of opposing perspectives, and collectively addressing traumas arising from a common conflict history.

The sequential coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in 2022-2023 supplanted the previous authorities with military juntas, headed by anti-Western-oriented officers who were determined to put an end to the regional presence and influence of France and the U.S. That prompt transformation created a permissive environment for Russia to step in. The post-Soviet comeback of Russia on the African continent has hastened since the late 2010s. A business enterprise (in fact, a state-private partnership) run by the late Yevgeny Prigozhin piloted this effort. Prigozhin’s activity involved the delivery of a compound package of security assistance and civil services to the client states in exchange for the extracted natural resources. His team consisted of mercenaries, political consultants, anthropologists, public relations specialists, and businesspersons.

The global security environment continues to erode as international polarization heightens. The accelerating strategic competition of opposing powers and alliances complicates and degrades different regional crises. While the major anxiety is fixated now on the war in Europe and the calamity in the Middle East, situations in some other parts of the world are also on the road to evolving into worst-case scenarios. One such area is the Sahel region, located in the heart of the African continent. The collapsing status quo, shifting geopolitical balances, and mounting troubles in the Sahel have no impending solutions and represent a cumulative security challenge, the resulting effects of which are likely to be felt far beyond that region and, indeed, that continent.

The most prominent political groups that currently hold seats in the EU parliament are the center-right European People’s Party (EPP), the center-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists & Democrats (S&D), the pro-business Renew Europe camp, the Greens, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), and Identity and Democracy (ID). The President of the EU Parliament is Maltese conservative politician Roberta Metsola, a member of the EPP. Various polls predict that the EPP and the S&D are likely to lose some seats while ECR and ID are likely to make gains.

As the formulation of the EU’s foreign and security policy strategy is by nature intergovernmental (it also has a diplomatic service that is formally its executor, but, in practice, it can also participate—and in numerous cases, lead—in its formulation), the capacity and authority of the EU institutions, including the European External Action Service, or EEAS) is limited in this regard. Although under official treaties and documents, the EU Parliament has limited power in foreign and security policy, as the EU’s sole elected body, it tries to apply fully its limited capacity and power in foreign and security policy. Simultaneously, the EU Parliament utilizes different areas of its capacity to influence foreign and security policy as well as its execution. In short, the EU Parliament is making significant efforts to influence the Union’s foreign and security policy.

President Ilham Aliyev made a point by welcoming United Arab Emirates Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (popularly known by his initials as MBZ) to Baku on 9 January 2024, using the first official visit of its kind to emphasize that this new phase in Azerbaijan-UAE bilateral relations has risen to the level of a strategic partnership.

In 2023, relations between Azerbaijan and Iran faced their most serious test in history. The attack on Azerbaijan’s embassy in Tehran led to an unprecedented decline in contacts between the two neighboring countries. However, the presence of common, primarily economic, interests has always encouraged Baku and Tehran to seek common ground and overcome crises. In January 2024, I had a chance to visit Iran and converse with various local analysts; this informs the contents of this IDD Analytical Policy Brief, as do conversations with various experts and retired diplomats in Baku.

The governments of the Latin American states generally prefer to respond to the challenge of organized crime (OC) with the use of hard power. The size of the criminal networks and the scope of their activities often require resorting to the active use of regular military forces beyond law enforcement agencies. Mexico started to use its army against cartels as early as 2006. The same practice is common in Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Central American states. However, the “militarization” of the fight against organized crime is generating several unintended consequences.

Wars, crises, and conflicts that make the headlines, especially if they are closer to us, often shade other areas of concern taking place in other parts of the world, making them all but disappear from the radar screen. One contemporary example is Latin America, a colossal geopolitical theater caught at a crossroads between prospective opportunities and inherent blocking challenges. One such challenge is the durable and ascending trend of organized crime (OC) that defies nation-states. With a virtual non-existence of interstate conflicts and a decline of politically- motivated guerrilla movements in Latin America, organized crime wages irregular warfare targeting not only profit but, potentially, a seizure of power as well.

The conflict over Ukraine has accelerated the transformation of the geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape, contributing to a shift in the global balance of power as we as to a disruption in the global food and energy supply. In this regard, more countries emerged as stronger contributors to the European continent’s energy security as the European Union, in particular, took steps to reduce its dependence on Russian fossil fuels through the imposition of a sanctions and export restrictions regime against that country.

Our region is going through tectonic changes. First, we saw the liberation war of Azerbaijan over its occupied territories in Karabakh. These internationally recognized lands of Azerbaijan were occupied by Armenia for more than 30 years. The war resulted in Russian peacekeepers entering Azerbaijani sovereign lands. Then began the Russian-Ukrainian war or, as some people call it, “all-European war.” And now we see drastic escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The end of 2023 pinned another flashpoint on the map of the forming global conflict. The crisis in the Red Sea, initially considered just an extension of the ongoing war in Gaza, suddenly acquired its own visible dimension after the Yemeni Houthi movement unleashed a maritime insurgency upon one of the world’s critical junctions. The ensuing effects of that action go far beyond the region, evolving to the level of a distinct international problem and distressing global trade and logistics.

The presidents of Iran and Russia, Ebrahim Raisi and Vladimir Putin, respectively, met on 7 December 2023 in Moscow where they held (according to the Kremlin’s spokesperson) “extremely intensive” discussions about the war in Gaza and the conflict over Ukraine as well as “multifaceted aspects of bilateral Iranian-Russian cooperation.” The leaders also discussed oil prices and other energy issues, as the meeting took place after a surprise trip by Putin to the Middle East (U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia, both on 6 December 2023).

This IDD paper analyzes EU-Azerbaijan relations and the EU’s “actorness” as a peace facilitator in the context of providing a summary of an Experts’ Workshop that took place on 2 November 2023 at ADA University under the auspices of the Institute for Development and Diplomacy’s Jean Monnet Center of Excellence in EU Studies, which aims inter alia to provide a platform for voices from three EaP countries (i.e., Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine) to discuss the future of the EaP framework (project number: 101085083).

Any big war revolutionizes warfare, compelling both political leaders and commanders to critically review many aspects of military strategy, operational art, tactics, and defense technologies. The war in Ukraine—the biggest armed conflict in Europe since 1945—provides the latest striking example of the changing nature of warfare. One of its intriguing facets is the course of action in the Black Sea, where a belligerent that virtually has no naval forces embattles the numerically superior navy of its adversary, thereby shifting the strategic environment in that theatre.

The polite, albeit often hidden, cooperation of the two Western-oriented countries of the Eastern Mediterranean continued for decades. The Turkish government did not sever its diplomatic relations after the Six Day War (1967) or the Yom Kippur War (1973), in spite of its dependence on Arab oil. Meanwhile, most of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (another key space for the projection of Israeli strategic depth) ended their diplomatic relations with Israel.

All C5+1 consultations—from the format’s establishment in 2015 until September 2023—had taken place at or below the ministerial level, including working groups touching upon economy, energy, environment, and security issues. Hence, holding the meeting with all its Heads of State, even if on the sidelines of a multilateral event, is—in and of itself—an important milestone in the history of interaction between the parties.

It is worth mentioning that all successive governments of Afghanistan—from the very beginning of the establishment of relations with Azerbaijan—have expressed their support to Baku’s policy regarding the conflict over Karabakh. For instance, in September 2020, when the Second Karabakh War began, Afghanistan’s government unequivocally demanded “the end of the occupation in Nagorno-Karabakh” and supported “the efforts by the people and government of Azerbaijan and other nations of the world in this regard.”

Priorities, challenges, and perspectives of cultural diplomacy of Azerbaijan; bilateral and multilateral cultural diplomacy; the role of non-state actors in cultural diplomacy; communication and media relations in cultural diplomacy; elaboration of a concept paper on Azerbaijan’s foreign cultural policy and its implementation mechanisms.

The enduring European War continues to emit insecurity to its whole periphery. There are few other places on the globe where that suggestion appears so evident than in the Greater Caspian region, which constitutes a part of the Silk Road region (a.k.a. Eurasia). One of the particular effects of the war became the advent of an alliance of strategic convenience between Russia and Iran. Beyond economic and political aspects, that alliance is attaining a clear and amplifying military dimension.

arly June, re-elected Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made major personnel changes in the cabinet. One of the key positions, the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, was awarded to Hakan Fidan, who had previously headed the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) of Türkiye for more than 13 years.

Troubling support for Armenian terrorism has been ongoing since the end of nineteenth century. Since 1991, it has enjoyed various forms of justification and glorification by the Armenian state itself, including in two noteworthy but contradictory instances that have taken place very recently (April and May 2023)—i.e., in the midst of the active phase in the peace negotiations between Yerevan and Baku

Unpredictability is one of the hallmarks of the Middle East. States that yesterday were on the verge of war are nowadays moving towards reconciliation. The tendency for rapprochement that has emerged in recent years between several countries, primarily between Israel and the Arab world, is becoming even more apparent today. This is especially true against the backdrop of a thaw in relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Syrian breakthrough after years of isolation, and Türkiye’s foreign policy achievements. At the same time, hot spots in the Middle East, starting with the unresolved Palestinian-Israeli issue, periodically remind us of themselves. In addition, due to the huge number of internal contradictions and the socio-political and economic crisis, the regional situation remains quite explosive, as, for example, recent events in Sudan have shown

Working Paper represents a first attempt to grasp the ascending global role of India, as well as its geopolitical mindset, ambitions, and interests, with particular emphasis on security concerns. More specifically, this document focuses on explaining how the need to maintain connectivity to the world drives India’s alliance-building strategy, including the logic and rationales behind the developing Indian-Armenian rapprochement.

The purpose of this IDD Analytical Policy Brief is to examine the state of the field, to highlight the existing and emerging trends and geographic regions of concern, and to place the phenomenon of terrorism into a broader context.

Azerbaijan has a solid and strong relationship with most of the 22 countries belonging to the Arab world. Although the roots of these ties can be traced back to the Arab conquest of Persia and the South Caucasus by the Abbasid Caliphate in the eighth century, the contemporary history of relations between the Arab and Muslim worlds, on the one hand, and Azerbaijan, on the other, began with the restoration of the latter’s independence in 1991. At that time, the country rapidly joined various international formats, including those that self-identified as belonging to the Muslim world.

Two recent events have further heightened scrutiny in Iran’s decent into domestic turbulence, which is now approaching its five-month anniversary. The first was a fatal act of terror against the embassy of Azerbaijan in the Islamic Republic of Iran committed on the morning of 27 January 2023; the second, a drone strike against Iranian state facilities in Isfahan, took place nearly two days later, late in the night of 28 January 2023.

This IDD analytic policy brief will thus examine the main aspects of the role of the Türkiye in the South Caucasus in the post-Second Karabakh War period and analyze different possible scenarios with regards to the evolution of Türkiye’s foreign policy in the South Caucasus.

Relations between China and the most active countries that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are evolving in new directions, as Beijing eyes opportunities to fill the gap that is emerging in the region in light of America’s waning influence and interest. Although the rapprochement between China and the GCC countries, particularly the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), is a source of concern for the United States, which still seeks to preserve its role as the region’s leading security patron, it is unlikely that Beijing’s influence in the critically important Gulf region will soon decline strategically as a result.

On 15-16 November 2022, Indonesia hosted the G20 summit, which was significantly different from previous events of this kind. For the first time since 2008, Russia was represented only at the level of Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. The war in Ukraine dominated the sidelines of the summit and was reflected in the final communiqué, which criticizes Russia’s actions rather harshly. Along with this, the most important negotiations took place on the eve of the summit: in particular, bilateral talks between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping, which, for example, had a positive impact on global financial markets. Although the G20 is often criticized for its inability to seriously respond to global challenges and threats, the outcome of the Bali summit will have important consequences for various regions of the world, including the South Caucasus. This IDD analytical policy brief will examine the foregoing in that context.

On 6 November 2022, Egypt’s Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry called on— successfully, as it turns out—the participants of the COP-27 climate summit in Sharm El Sheikh “to discuss the pressing issue of funding arrangements needed to deal with existing gaps, responding to ‘loss and damage.’” In this way, the strategic agenda of COP-27 came into direct conceptual contact with one of the main objectives advanced by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) from the onset of Azerbaijan’s chairmanship of the Organization.

Welcome everyone and let me introduce our keynote speaker today. For the past two years, we have had a lot of webinars and online sessions. But now people are back to their daily routine, and somehow webinars are again becoming exciting as something we have missed from the pandemic period.

The conflict over Ukraine put Turkey in a very difficult place, since it is known to have built friendly relations with both Moscow and Kyiv. At the same time, against all odds, Ankara turned out to be a key mediator (notwithstanding the fact that it is a NATO member state), if not the only one, in the quest to reduce tensions in the unprecedented confrontation between Russia and the West.

In March 2022, Israel hosted the Negev Summit, an unprecedented diplomatic conference under the aegis of Foreign Minister Yair Lapid. Participants included U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and the foreign ministers of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Morocco, and Bahrain. This ministerial conference represents the latest step of rapprochement between Israel and the Arab world. Although it has not reached the point of no return, the unfolding process is opening up new prospects for the Middle East and for the many countries beyond the region that hold close ties with that part of the world, including those located in the South Caucasus.

Chairman Mao is reputed to have described his foreign policy posture with a metaphor: “when the tigers fight in the valley, the wise monkey sits on the hill and watches how it ends.” This dictum comes to mind while assessing the strategy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) towards unfolding developments in the conflict over Ukraine, which is in fact turning out to be European war, given its magnitude and the parties involved, directly or not. Indeed, while the major players in this drama—the United States (which is China’s global competitor), the EU, and Russia—remain overwhelmingly preoccupied by the crisis, the officially neutral Beijing can, and most likely will, try to use this opportunity to bolster its position and advance its interests.